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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University 
Institute was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
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A. The Regulation of Drug Development in Europe:
A Statement of the Problem
The regulation of drug developemnt in the European Community is at a 
crossroad. The White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market 
states:
"The internal market shall comprise an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty". <5>
This goal should be achieved by 1993. However, formidable barriers 
exists for the achievement of this goal in the case of medicinal products. 
These barriers have deep historical roots, and because the roots are 
historical, they are specific to the traditions of each individual member 
state.<9;15;25;42;54>
The regulation of the supply of drugs is a multi-layered process, 
because it is an exceptional blend of actual or suspected sources of market 
failure. Firstly, drugs are products characterized by credence qualities 
<25;35;36>. It is suspected that bad qualities drive good qualities from the 
market. Secondly, the supply of drugs is thought to be subjected to 
propensities to monopolize due to the price inelasticity of demand. 
Thirdly, the demand for drugs is plagued by principal-agent problems. 
<6;25;26>
(1) Medical theories have changed over the centuries. But for millenia a 
secular constant has been the concern over the purity of the ingredients of 
the medicinal preparations. Galen, the physician of the Emperor Marcus 
Aurelius Antoninus was so obsessed by the fear of adulterated bulk 
material that he hired an adulteror of drugs in order to learn how to 
protect himself against adulteration. And in the 20s of our century, when 
the drug companies were still mostly producers of herbal bulkware, 
branded herbal bulkware carried prices up to four times higher than the 
generic one. The argument then has been: superior and assured quality. 
The counter-argument has been: the formulations of the Pharmacopeia set 
controllable standards, so that the price differentials are unjustified. The 
situation today is quite similar. There is as great a concern about 
"adulterated" drugs as during Galen's or our grandfathers’ time. Branded 
products are much more expensive than generic ones. But has not dmg 
regulation been brought in, in order to set controllable standards? 
<47;48>
(2) Up to the 1920's, even the 1930's, the main source of monopoly 
power of the drug supplier may be called quality ignorance of the patient. 




























































































bought without a prescription by the physician. Drug companies, 
therefore, directed their advertisements directly to the patients or to the 
pharmacists. This changed with the advent of the wonder-drugs. Firstly, 
they were highly potent and, therefore, in Paracelsus’ words highly useful 
poisons. To protect the patient against poisoning himself he had to be 
restricted by the physician's prescription. Secondly, the new drugs were 
curative and life-saving. For that reason the price elasticity of demand 
declined sharply. In response, a marked tendency to monopolize is 
predicted by economic theory. Is the prediction supported by changes in 
market structure?
Prior to the advent of the antibiotics most drug manufacturers were 
mere suppliers of bulkware. The first antibiotic patent on streptomycin 
was licensed at the then normal royalty rate of 2.5% of sales. Since the 
research on streptomycin had been done in public facilities at Rutgers 
University, a higher license fee was thought to be unreasonable. However, 
an analysis of post-streptomycin prices reveals antibiotic price-unit cost 
ratios or "imputed" license fees of 80%. That is a 32 fold increase in 
royalty rates. Assuming constant unit costs and short run profit 
maximization in pre- and post-streptomycin situations, this change implies 
a decrease in the price elasticity of demand from 40 to 1.25 or an increase 
of price from 1.025 to five times unit costs.
Obviously, to openly change the license fees in the market for 
antibiotic bulkware from 2.5% to 80% of sales must have appeared 
exploitative to the general public. If however, the drug companies would 
integrate forward and alter their structure from a mere producer of 
bulkware to a supplier of final dosage forms, open market transactions 
would be transformed into hidden, internal transfer prices. Vertical 
forward integration had the further advantage that the supplier of the 
patented new drug would be able to directly address his advertisements to 
those who controlled the access to the patients: the prescribing physicians.
Thus a change in medical theory accompanied by the discovery of 
research and development as a method to exploit new medical insights 
altered the basic conditions for pricing new drugs, and stimulated a 
change in industry structure from vertical disintegration to complete 
vertical integration.
(3) The patient-doctor relationship can be seen as one between principal 
and agent. Yet the relationship is an imperfect one. Typically the patient is 
insured against the financial risks of sickness. This has the effect, called 
moral hazard, that a larger quantity of health care will be demanded at a 
higher price. The precise effects on quantity and on price elasticity 
depend on the specifics of the re-imbursement scheme. Moral hazard 
permeates the patient-doctor relationship. The patient has neither the 
knowledge nor the incentive to search for cost-minimizing treatments. 
Inefficiencies in the health services raise insurance fees. But this effect 




























































































is in a free rider situation. The doctor may or may not know the most 
efficient treatment. Since he does not pay, he has no incentive to search 
for it or to choose it. On the contrary, revenue maximization induces him 
to placate the patient's desire for care by supplying services of doubtful 
efficacy. The health insurance, which pays the bill, has little information 
on cost-effectiveness. And as long as it is protected by compulsory 
membership or other state-imposed restraints of competition, it has only 
weak incentives to enforce cost-effectiveness.
This short review of the problems of the supply of medicinal products 
is thought to be suggestive, rather than exhaustive or balanced. For the 
following argument it is irrelevant,
(a) whether and to what extent "quality" regulation of drugs is necessary,
(b) whether and to what extent a propensity to monopolize exists or is 
moderated by workable competition,
(c) whether and to what extent the patient-doctor relationship is infected 
by problems of moral hazard.
It suffices to recognize that such fears found certain political 
expressions at certain points in time in certain member states of the 
Community. Each member state has found a unique response if not to 
unique questions, then at least to questions posed in a unique way.
Ever since its first pharmaceutical directive 65/65 EEC, the 
Commission has worked on the goal of achieving the mutual recognition 
of drugs in the sense that a particular drug authorized to be marketed by 
the competent authority in one member state would routinely be admitted 
by the authorities of the other member states. To achieve that goal the 
Commission has harmonized the whole dmg review process from animal 
studies to clinical research on patients. Yet the harmonization of testing 
and review principles has not brought the routine mutual recognition. 
Quite to the contrary, national competent authorities routinely raise 
objections against each other's decision to authorize the marketing of 
drugs.
The reason is clear. Rules and principles have to be applied in the 
light of value judgements in matters of benefits and risks. Both are multi­
dimensional concepts. A drug has a more or less wide range of 
effectiveness of curing, of treating symptoms, and of alleviating pain. 
Certain unwanted side-effects may be present in one and not in another 
group of patients. Judgements on acceptable risks are inherently 
subjective. How scientifically established aspects of a drug are valued 
depends upon opinions of medical schools, cultural traits of a country, and 
the extent to which social and economic policy considerations are 
imported into the regulatory decision of drug admission. Antibiotics, oral 
antidiabetics, neurological drugs, drugs against coronary diseases, even 
oral contraceptives show highly peculiar national characteristics of 
consumption. Social and economic considerations differ in their 
importance for the evaluation of the benefits and risks of a particular 




























































































basis of comparing the new drug with already existing ones, in another 
country comparative judgements may not be allowed.
For reasons like these the Commission has failed in its efforts to 
achieve the mutual recognition of marketing authorizations. But even if 
the national competent authorities would mutually recognize their 
marketing authorizations, the fact remains that a new drug will not be 
uniformly available in all member states. The member states differ in 
their social security systems. Health insurance as such influences already 
the rate and direction of innovative activity in ways specific to the system. 
But imbedded in or parallel to social security countries practice various 
forms of price regulation and expenditure control in order to combat 
suspected monopolistic practices and moral hazard. These regulations 
determine whether and on what terms a drug which has been authorized 
to be marketed may actually be sold in a national market. Thus, each 
member state has to an important degree a unique set of institutional 
incentives for and constraints on choosing where to operate on the 
invention-innovation frontier of drugs.
What is the likely response of the Commission to this situation? 
Realizing that the mutual recognition does not and cannot follow upon the 
harmonization of testing and evaluation mles, the Commission will have 
to push for the installation of a common European Institution of Dmg 
Admission (EIDA). A decision by EIDA would not, however, ensure that 
a new drug is uniformly available in all national drug markets. Different 
reimbursement schemes, price, profit, and expenditure regulations remain 
as barriers against the free movement of drugs. Eventually the 
Commission has to harmonize these regulations too.
Since that is a very distant step, what remains to be said about the next 
step of creating EIDA? Obviously, its institutional design will have far- 
reaching effects on the quality and the costs of the regulatory decisions. 
But what are the options for an institutional design, what are their effects 
on the regulatory process? This is not obvious! For possible answers we 
have to study the complexity of the regulatory task, the regulatory 
environment, and the organizational options of performing drug 
regulation.
A study of the organizational options for performing the regulation of 
drug development may start with a comparative evaluation of national 
dmg regulation systems. Such an effort is beyond the scope of this paper. 
It is also not necessary for the reason that only two principles exist for 
such an organizational design: the agency solution on the one hand, and 
the expert committee solution on the other hand. The US Food and Dmg 
Administration (FDA) is a much studied and well documented example of 
the first regulatory approach. The British Committee on the Safety o f 
Medicines (CSM) is a typical representative of the other regulatory 
approach. Since its way of operation is less known, the following 
procedure is chosen. First, we study the general characteristics of the 




























































































regulatory task. In a second step we study how the British approach to 
drug regulation has evolved as specific problems were identified and 
called for solutions. If we combine that information with what is already 
known about the operation of a FDA-type of regulatory system, we may 
be able to reach certain conclusions about the principles of organizing 
EIDA.
B. The Complexity of the Task of Regulating Drug 
Development
For every 1-2 "new chemical entities" (NCE) admitted to the market as a 
new drug some 10,000 chemical compounds are synthesized in the 
laboratory and screened for effects by administering them to isolated 
organs, to tissues, tumor cells, microbes, etc. Of the 10,000 NCEs some 
1,000 look so promising that the initiation of animal toxicology studies 
seems justified. Because in the past certain drug disasters like the one 
involving Elixir Sulfanilamide <17> could have been avoided by simple 
animal tests, animal toxicology is seen as imperative before daring to 
further test a drug in healthy humans.
One of the first tasks in animal toxicology is the determination of that 
dose, measured by mg/kg weight of the body, which kills 50% of the 
animals. Besides this letal dose LD50 an effectivity dose ED50 which has 
a success rate of 50% is measured. The quotient ED50/LD50 gives some 
very rough indication of the risk of giving the compound to humans 
<56;57>.
The next two steps in animal studies are what is called 
pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics. Pharmacokinetics deals with 
such questions as:
* How is the substance distributed in the body?
* How is the substance eliminated by the body?
* Does the substance accumulate in some organs or e.g. in the bones?
* What happens with the bioavailability of the compound if given by 
different routes and in different formulations?
* How does the body transform - metabolize - the substance by its various 
physiological processes?
Pharmacodynamics is concerned with one of the most difficult tasks, 
namely the determination of how and why the compound works as 
measured by observable effects. Since only a few mechanisms of cause 
and effect have as yet been clarified, pharmacodynamics is a very 
uncertain part of drug research.
In regard to effectiveness in humans animal studies are highly 
unreliable models of evaluation<35;51;56;57>. This is especially true for 
the long-mn animal studies which search for carcinogenic and mutagenic 




























































































among some strains of the same animal; e.g. some strains of mice might 
develop breast cancer, while others do not. Toxicity results may lead to a 
wrong extrapolation about damages to certain organs. Animals vary 
widely in the way they metabolize substances, and humans may vary 
widely from animals. The antirheumatic effects of phenylbutazone could 
not be established in animals because they eliminate the substance in a few 
minutes, whereas man metabolizes only 15% per day. If Fleming would 
have tested penicillin on guinea pigs, probably the substance would never 
have seen the light as a wonder-drug, because it is a violent poison for 
them although not for mice. But penicillin is not a unique case. If judged 
by today's standards of animal studies, drugs like adrenalin, aspirin, 
cortisone, insulin, streptomycin, tetracycline, and numerous other ones 
would not be available, because they have highly detrimental effects 
during some phase of the animal studies.
Of the 1,000 NCEs on which animal toxicology had begun, ten 
survive and enter what is called phase I research. Here the drug is given 
to a small group of about ten healthy volunteers in order to study its 
pharmacokinetics. Phase I research is mainly concerned with safety 
aspects. What is the appropriate dose? What is a suitable formulation ? 
How does it influence the bioavailability of the substance? Once the 
relative safety of the compound has been established, the 
pharmacodynamics, i.e. the efficacy of the prospective drug is detected 
during phase II research by giving it to a larger group of up to 100-200 
patients. Having completed phase II the drug is taken over into phase III 
research on a still larger group of patients in order to search for possible 
adverse drug reactions (ADR) with and without taking the NCE in 
combination with other pharmaceuticals. During phase III research an 
application to admit the drug to the market will be filed 
<1;25;26;28;32;51;55>. Only 5% of all drugs entering phase III are not 
admitted to the market, whereas almost 30% of all drugs leaving animal 
toxicology do not survive beyond phase I, and close to 40% of all drugs 
leaving phase I do not survive beyond phase II. Thus, the knowledge 
gained during phase III on potential ADRs is apparently rather small 
<49>.
However, the chain of events stimulated by a drug may be very 
complex and may depend in various unknown ways on the specific 
situation of the patient or the patient-doctor relationship. Furthermore, 
unfounded claims tend to be made for all kinds of "patent medicines". 
Therefore, in 1954 Lasagna developed the concept of the randomized, 
double-blind, controlled clinical trial RCCT for founding an unbiased 
basis of drug evaluation. However attractive this test procedure looks in 
the eyes of the sceptic, it cannot be defended on a priori grounds to be the 
only valid test procedure. There must be room for choosing some other 
test design according to specific circumstances <32>.
Besides, the RCCT is not failure proof. Patient and doctor have a strong 



























































































the condition of a patient in a group selected for treatment by a less potent 
drug deteriorates, the physician may respond by giving additional care. 
Thus the comparative results may be biased.
While an ideal RCCT tells that a new drug is superior if given to a large 
GROUP of patients, it can say little about what it does to the individual 
patient in the everyday environment of the general practitioner GP. But, 
as has been shown by Lasagna too, for numerous reasons the naturalistic 
environment is the proper testing ground for a new drug. Hence phase II 
and III clinical studies, whether or not conducted on the basis of the 
RCCT, leave important questions on the safety and efficacy profile of a 
new drug unanswered. Research during the period of actually marketing 
the drug, phase IV , is left as the only way to collect information which is 
not readily appearing in relatively small groups of patients.
A first step in the direction of a post- marketing surveillance of drugs 
were post-marketing clinical studies. In 1970 Levadopa was admitted to 
the US market although not all clinical and toxicological studies had been 
completed, because people suffering from Parkinson's disease could be 
treated effectively for the first time. Some 1,500 patients were monitored 
for ADRs for a period of up to six years <31>. This drug admission 
procedure is called monitored release. But even such a large group of 
patients is too small to detect ADRs beyond the 0.1% level of likelihood 
of occurrence.
Also in 1970 a new beta-blocker - practolol - was admitted to the 
British market. It had fewer serious side-effects in the treatment of angina 
pectoris, high blood pressure, and disorders of heart rhythm. Therefore, 
it became the beta-blocker of first choice. After four years with an 
accumulated population of 200,000 users an ophthalmologist saw patients 
who complained about dry eyes. He heard that all were taking practolol. 
Upon reports to the company further investigations revealed that practolol 
leads to a very rare immunological reaction whose mechanism is unclear, 
but which necessitates eye surgery and leads to blindness occasionally <35, 
pp.79-81>.
Could such rare ADRs be detected ex ante during clinical phase II or 
III research? To better understand the situation, let us look at the risks of 
dying from certain illnesses or from other causes. The estimation of these 
risks tends to be highly imprecise. The confidence limits spans an order of 
magnitude. A particular event may, for instance, have the chance to occur 
in a group of 1 to <10, in a group of 10 to <100, or in a group of 100 to 
<1000 people. Correspondingly we may talk of risk levels 1, 2, or 3. 
This enumeration is unfortunate in that a lower risk level, e.g. 2 in 
comparison to 3, receives a higher number. But a risk level of one per 
thousand may be written as 1/1000 or lxlO 3. Therefore, I choose the 




























































































Table 1: Comparative Risks of Mortality Caused by Illnesses and other 
Events
Risk Level RL i.e. one 
death per year among
Cause of Death by a
General Popu­
lation
Specific Illness or some other Event in:
Patients with a Other Event 
specific disease
RL -1: 1 — <10 Tetanus
RL-2: 10 — <102 Cancer, Diabetes Any
RL -3: 102. <103 Cancer, Coronary 
Disease
Arthritis
RL -4: 103-<104 Peptic Ulcer
RL-5: 104 .<105 Arthritis,Diabetes Whooping Cough Motor Car, 
Suicide








RL -8: 107 - <108 Accute Rheumatic Fever ----- Lighming
Source: Inman <19, pp.21-25>
The table says for instance: In a general population of ten to hundred 
thousand people one person will die either by suicide or by arthritis. But 
one person among one hundred to one thousand persons who actually 
suffer from arthritis is going to die from the disease. The ability to 
discover an ADR during phase III research lies around one percent. To 
test a new drug in a group of 100 - 200 patients requires a much larger 
overall sample size of patients, if the drug is tested against several other 
pharmaceuticals in a RCCT environment. As in the case of Levadopa risk 
level -3 may be reached by monitored release. To push the reasoning to 
some kind of extreme let us consider the introduction of a new drug 
against arthritis. By phase III research we are able to reach down to risk 
level -2. This does not exclude a lethal ADR in risk level -3. Assume both 
probabilities to die are the same with a chance of 1 in 1000. Assume 
further-more, a situation (1) in which the new drug does not heal but only 
alleviates the pains of arthritis, and a situation (2) where the drug cures 
arthritis with certainty. In the first case the patient's overall probability to 
die doubles from 1/1,000 to 2/1,000 or 1/500. In the second case the 
patient substitutes the risk to die from arthritis by the same risk to die 
while curing arthritis. In the first case the new drug becomes more 
acceptable the lower the risk level of the letal ADR. If the risk of dying 
from the ADR is not in level -3 but in -5 , the overall risk of dying from 
arthritis and its treatment increases from 1/1,000 to 1/1,000 + 1/100,000, 
that is from 0.001 to o.001001. That increase in overall risk appears 
bearable if the benefits from alleviating pain are reasonably large. The 
second case is obvious. A risk of 0.001 to die from arthritis is substituted 
against the risk of 0.00001 to die from the drug which cures the illness. 
Even if the drug has a probability to heal much lower than one, the 




























































































drug has a probability of 20% to cure arthritis. Then the patient has a risk 
of 0.8 x 0.001 to die from arthritis and a risk of 0.00001 to die from the 
ADR of the drug treatment. His total risk of drug treatment is 0.00081 
which is by an order of magnitude lower than the no-treatment risk.
These purely illustrative calculations demonstrate that information on 
the relative frequencies of ADRs is vitally important for the estimation of 
reasonably accurate benefit-risk ratios of drugs. But here we confront a 
paradox of some kind. A serious illness, i.e. one in a mortality risk level 
of -2 or -3, requires reliable information on ADRs down to risk levels -4 
or -5, whereas a less serious illness, i.e. one in mortality risk level -5, 
requires a much lower risk level for ADRs of -6 or -7. Since the sample 
size of patients required for achieving a lower risk level rises 
geometrically, the costs to establish a reliable benefit-risk ratio of a drug 
increase while the benefits of the drug decrease <23>.
Phase III research is no economical method to reach down to lower 
risk levels of drug treatment. If we would want to go down to risk level - 
4 we would need groups of up to 10,000 patients. This would be an 
unbearable burden on clinical investigators and on patients. It would also 
be prohibitively costly. Therefore, the discovery of rare ADRs can only 
be made and financed by actually selling the drug. This leads to post­
marketing surveillance PMS as the other method of performing what is 
called phase IV research.
However PMS is not only a method to discover rare ADRs, it also 
helps to detect unexpected new indications of a drug. The following table 
lists a few examples of indications discovered by serendipity after their 
admission to the market:
Table 2: New Indications of Drugs Discovered Serendipitiously































































































































Our provisional conclusions are: firstly, the discovery of drugs is a 
process with a very high degree of empirism, that means, biomedical 
sciences have a low ability to predict the likely effects of new chemical 
entities on the inter- and intra-cellular physiological processes of the 
human body <25;35;51;56;57>. Secondly, to establish the benefits and the 
relatively frequent risks of a new drug candidate necessitates lengthy and 
costly animal studies and phase I to phase III research. These phases of 
drug discovery are densely regulated. What is the impact of regulation on 
the efficiency of the drug discovery process? Thirdly, any effort to 
estimate the benefit-risk ratio of a new drug depends critically on an 
effective system of post-marketing surveillance <21;22;39;40;43>. It is 
the contention of the following analysis, that in both respects the British 
system of dmg regulation offers exemplary insights.
C. The British Approach to Control the Admission of New 
Drugs
1. On the History of Drug Control: From Henry VIII to Sir 
Derrick Dunlop <28;54;55>
The physician's concern about the quality of medicines is a secular one. 
Until a few decades ago the medicines were derived from plants, herbs, or 
like snake oil from animals. There were also "patent medicines" like 
unicorn horn, or eunuch fat. Adulteration of drugs was common. In 1540 
Henry VIII promulgated a law against the adulteration of medicines and 
founded an inspectorate for the supervision of pharmacies. Other acts 
followed over the centuries. In 1858 the first statutory edition of the 
British Pharmacopeia laid the ground for a continuous standardization of 
quality control measures. In 1875 the first Food and Drug Act penalized 
the adulteration of drags. But few effective drags were available. Notable 
exceptions were morphine, known since antiquity, digitalis, discovered in 
the 18th century, and quinine for the treatment of "the fevers". Quinine 
was replaced by salicin, derived from the willow tree - Salix - growing in 
the swamps, where "the fevers" were thought to originate. Salicin led to 
the discovery of aspirin.
The number of effective drugs was not only limited to a mere 
handful, several of those few, especially the heavy metals mercury and 
bismuth were also highly hazardous. Syphilis, brought to Europe upon 
Columbus' return in 1493, was a common dreadful illness. Drer wrote 
from Venice:
"There is nothing that I fear more than the « F ren ch  sickness» , 
everybody has it."
Drinking a kind of extract from a tree induced a high fever, the first 




























































































although wrongly, against this treatment. "Ungentuum griseum", a 
mercury-porkfat salve, remained as the only slightly effective treatment. 
Its other substitute became the artificial infection with malaria. There was 
a chance that the high fever killed the spirochetes faster than the infected 
person. For centuries, therefore, the saying was valid:
"One night spent with Venus, and a lifetime with Mercury".
After the First World War organic arsenicals replaced mercury in the 
treatment of syphilis.. But an epidemic of jaundice and fatal hepatic 
necrosis among British soldiers treated for syphilis with organic 
arsenicals called forth the first report by the first Medical Research 
Council in British history in 1922.
But time was not ripe for a radically new approach to drug safety for 
the very reason that drug treatment was so inherently risky. The approach 
to drug safety remained a piece-meal one. A Dangerous Drug Act of 1920 
was concerned with the problem of addiction. The introduction of insulin 
in 1922 raised problems of quality control. The 1930s saw the 
introduction of the first wonder-drugs against bacterial infections, the 
sulfonamides. Now a night could be spent with Venus, and gone were the 
horrific consequences of the love affair. After the sulfonamides came the 
antibiotics and the tranquilizers. Adverse dmg reactions were observed, 
but they raised no fundamental concern in view of the hitherto unknown 
potency of the new generation of pharmaceuticals. In 1961 the medical 
community was jolted out of its sense of security by the thalidomide 
disaster. A special joint subcommittee established by the English and 
Scottish Medical Association recommended the foundation of an expert 
committee for the review of scientific evidence on new and old drugs. 
This led to the Committee on the Safety of Drugs CSD which started to 
work on January 1, 1964 under the chairmanship of Sir Derrick Dunlop. 
The CSD ceased its operation in September 1971, when its work was 
taken over by the Committee on the Safety of Medicines CSM. Sir 
Derrick's chairmanship has been hailed as a milestone in the development 
of an efficient drug control system.
Compliance with the decisions of the CSD was voluntary. The 
Association o f the British Pharmaceutical Industry ABPI and of the 
Proprietary Association o f Great Britain PAGB had promised that their 
members would seek advice on the conduct of toxicology and clinical 
tests, that they would submit the toxicity tests to the CSD before the 
initiation of clinical trials, whose results had to be presented to the CSD 
too, and that they would consult with the CSD in matters of warnings on 
ADRs and restrictions of a drug's use.
The CSD set up specific subcommittees which dealt with all problems 
of consultation and decision in a fast, informal, and unbureaucratic 
manner. The CSD put a major effort in the establishment of the Yellow 
Card System of post-marketing monitoring the drugs for ADRs. Under 
this system doctors are invited to use pre-paid, yellow cards for reporting 




























































































special subcommittee. In case the subcommmittee finds sufficient 
supporting evidence special leaflets warn every physician. One of the first 
warnings concerned the risk of sudden deaths among young asthmatics 
using pressurized aerosols with sympathomimetic amines. Another case 
concerned reports that women taking oral contraceptives had a higher risk 
of trombosis in unusual sites such as the veins of the face or the breasts. 
An analysis of the Yellow Card reports showed possible links to the 
dosage of the oestrogen, and eventually led to the recommendation of the 
Mini Pill as a solution to the problem.
The subcommittee which recommended the foundation of the CSD on 
a voluntary basis had also recommended to eventually turn to a legally 
binding system of drug regulation. One major reason was that the 
voluntary system reached only the members of the ABPI and the PAGB 
plus a few non-committed firms . The total number was about 600 
companies. A white Paper on Forthcoming Legislation on the Safety, 
Quality and Description o f Drugs and Medicines of 1967 laid the ground 
for the Medicines Act of 1968.
2. Drug Regulation under the Medicines Act
2.1. Pre-Marketing Regulation o f Drugs
Two years after its promulgation the Medicines Act became operative. A 
Medicines Commission, as of 1986 comprising 19 members selected from 
physicians, veterinary surgeons, chemists, pharmacists and from industry, 
was set up as an independent body. The routine administrative work is 
earned out by civil servants in the Medicines Division of the Department 
of Health and Social Security. The institutions have now been renamed the 
Medicines Control Agency (MCA) of the Department of Health DoH. 
Upon advice from the MCA the ministers of health and of agriculture 
appoint independent experts for a period of four years (renewable) as 
members of special subcommittees whose function is to advice the 
Licensing Authority in the MCA in its decisions on various aspects of 
drug regulation. In that respect three subcommittees are of special 
importance, namely
* t he Committee on Safety o f Medicines (CSM),
* the Committee o f the Review o f Medicines (CRM),
* the Committee on the British Pharmacopeia.
Each committee comprises 18-19 independent experts as members drawn 
from various specializations.
The Medicines Act introduced a licensing system for the introduction 
of all new and already existing drugs. All drugs which were sold prior to 
September 1, 1971 could receive a licence o f right from the Licensing 
Authority. About 36,000 products were granted such licences. By now 




























































































and relative safety. Products that pass the Licensing Authority after 
review and upon advice by the CSM or the CRM are granted product 
licences. They are issued for a duration of five years, renewal is possible.
In regard to the manufacture and sale of drugs specific licences have 
to be applied for. The MCA maintains an inspectorate for the control of 
quality standards.
The CSM advises on the admission of new drugs. To increase its 
degree of specialization while simultaneously preserving its operational 
workability, the CSM has founded subcommittees for certain tasks:
* a subcommittee on chemistry and pharmacology,
* a subcommittee on biological and antimicrobal substances,
* a subcommittee on standards of herbal products,
* a subcommittee on toxicology, clinical trials, and therapeutic efficacy,
* a subcommittee on adverse drug reactions.
In Great Britain, and contrary to US procedure, the drug manufacturer is 
permitted to pursue his development of a NCE until he has completed the 
tests in healthy volunteers. Before he begins tests on patients he has to 
obtain a Clinical Trial Certificate (CTC) from the MCA which is based on 
the full documentation of the test results of the animal studies and the ones 
on healthy volunteers. However for about eight years most in-patient- 
studies are now conducted under clinical trial exemption certificates 
(CTX). This procedure has been introduced in order to speed up the 
regulatory decision making and in order to prevent a shift of clinical 
research from Great Britain to foreign countries. Under the CTX 
procedure the MCA receives a summary report of the full documentation 
of the test results, and if the agency does not object within 35 days (an 
extension of 28 days is possible), the company is automatically allowed to 
begin with the clinical studies in patients.
The CSM does not consider ethical questions of clinical trials. These 
are delt with separately by ethics committees formed by hospitals on a 
regional basis. If all trials have been completed, the company may apply 
for a product licence. The subcommittee responsible for the evaluation of 
the application, e.g. the CSM or the CRM advises the Licensing Authority. 
If it is unable to advise the issue of a licence, the applicant is given the 
opportunity to respond to the opinion of the Committee in an oral hearing 
or in written comments by presenting new arguments, evidence, or by 
modifying the application. The Committee reconsiders its opinion in the 
light of the representations of the applicant. If the Committee remains 
unconvinced, it may render the advice of a flat refusal of a licence. 
However, such a procedure is most unlikely. Usually the Committee 
decides "to provisionally not advise" the issue of a licence, and gives the 
applicant a second chance to respond. If the applicant fails to convince the 
Committee of its position, he may apply to the MCA as the final resort of 
appeal during the advisory procedure.
The Licensing Authority is not bound by the opinion of the CSM or 




























































































quality the Authority has to reconsult the CSM or the MCA, if it 
disregards their opinion. The applicant for a product licence can appeal to 
the High Court of England (Court of Session in Scotland) for a review of 
the decision of the Licensing Authority in matters of law.
2.2. The Post-Marketing Surveillance of Drugs
Several approaches to post-marketing surveillance coexist in Great Britain 
<3;4;18;19;20;21;22;23;24;31;40;43;45>. They are more complementary 
than competitive. A basic methodological distinction should be made 
between observational and interventionist studies. The former collects 
data after the therapeutic decision has been made. The latter is a clinical 
trial.
The CSM inherited the Yellow Card System from the CSD. The 
system is operated by the MCA of the DoH under the advice of the CSM's 
subcommittee on adverse drug reactions. All prescribing doctors receive 
pre-paid yellow cards and are invited to report all serious or unusual 
reactions to drugs, be they old drugs or new ones. Some 16,000 cards per 
year are returned. Roughly half of them are mailed by GPs, 35% come in 
from hospitals, and the rest from sources like dental surgeons or 
coroners. The MCA has a number of full-time, in-house physicians who 
discuss all incoming reports, follow-up reported events for possible links 
to the literature, communicate with the reporting doctor for further 
information, and may seek the contact and advice of some 200 part-time 
collaborating medical field workers.
The Yellow Card System missed the rare adverse drug reaction of 
practolol, but it had successess like the detection of the thromboembolic 
risk of oral contraceptives. It is an imperfect system. First, there is a 
tendency to underreport observed events. It is estimated that only 10% of 
the observed drug related events are reported. Second, the Yellow Card 
System gives only anecdotal evidence in the sense that it is unable to give 
data on the absolute number of drug treatments. Hence it lacks the 
denominator as a basis to calculate the relative frequency whith which a 
drug related event occurs.
The tendency of underreporting has several reasons. An almost 
unsurmountable problem is given by the task
a) to define an adverse drug reaction in an operational way, and
b) to discern when an adverse drug reaction is present.
Given that patients tend to be in a situation which is therapeutically unique 
to some extent, how is it possible to distinguish an adverse event occuring 
during the treatment from an adverse reaction caused by a specific drug? 
This problem is especially serious when drugs are given against life- 
threatening malignancies for the very reason that these drugs are almost 
always higly toxic. Other reasons are related to the fact that doctors are 
failing human beings too, e.g. fearing to be accused of negligence or 




























































































To overcome problems like these another surveillance system had 
been founded in 1980. It is called Prescription Event Monitoring - PEM - 
and is operated by the Drug Safety Research Unit DSRU at the University 
of Southampton. Its founder and current director Professor W.H.W. 
Inman had previously worked to establish the Yellow Card System. How 
PEM operates is best described by reporting on PEM's first pilot study of 
the anti-arthritic drug benoxaprofen or Opren <18;19;20>.
DRSU asked the Prescription Pricing Authority PPA, which collects 
all prescriptions written for the National Health Service in order to 
remunerate the pharmacists, to identify all prescriptions for Opren 
written since January 1, 1981. The prescriptions identify the doctor and 
the patient. For the pilot study 6,000 patients were chosen. On January 1, 
1982 Green Cards were sent to their doctors that inquired about any 
unusual event observed during the past twelve months. The doctor is not 
asked to make any inference about drug related causes and effects, he 
simply reports the events that he has stored in his records anyhow. Upon 
return of the Green Cards eight cases of jaundice were discovered. 
Because by now DSRU knew both the names of the patient and of his 
doctor, these discoveries were followed up. It turned out that five of the 
eight cases were unrelated to the drug. By that time some further 18,000 
patients had been included in the study expanding the number of kidney or 
liver failures by 46 cases. 48 of the total of 54 cases could be followed up 
successfully. In those 48 cases only a single one could be related to Opren 
with a high degree of confidence. In five other cases Opren could not be 
ruled out as a probable cause. Adding the six cases which could not be 
investigated to the probable cases, the record for the ADR "liver or 
kidney failure" among a total population of 24,000 patients was the 
following:
* one patient whose ADR was almost certainly caused by Opren, but he 
recovered after stopping the treatment with the drug,
* and eleven patients whose ADR might have been caused by Opren.
In the meantime it had also been discovered that the dose of 6oo mg per 
day was to high, because the drug had a long life-time. It was especially 
hazardous for elderly patients of the age of 70 and more. Yet about 40% 
of all patients receiving Opren were in that age group. Consequently that 
group could be expected to show larger incidences of kidney or liver 
failure. Reduction of the daily dose would have been the appropriate 
response. Yet, the discovery came too late. On May 8, 1982 the British 
Medical Journal published a note, where a doctor reported that all six 
patients that he ever treated with Opren had died. This anecdotal evidence 
sufficed to push the CSM and the Licensing Authority to revoke the 
product licence in July 1982.
Although PEM's results came too late to prevent a panic decision, the 
episode demonstrates how PEM can be used both pro- and retrospectively 
to study a given drug in a sample population of 20.000 patients. About 




























































































drugs are evaluated simultaneously; each physician receives four Green 
Cards per drug in order to keep the burden of cooperation in narrow 
bounds. A response rate of 70% of all GPs is already high on its own 
terms. But it is still higher in view of the fact that 10% of the cases are 
lost, because patients move out of England to other parts of Great Britain, 
5% of the cases are lost because doctors have retired. Hence only 15% of 
the cases could be related to some kind of unwillingness to cooperate. Yet 
that percentage may result from the fact that these doctors are engaged in 
investigational studies for drug companies.
PEM is limited in its coverage to England. In Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland the correct identification of a patient from the 
prescriptions is extremely difficult for a very simple reason <23>: The 
inhabitants share a very limited number of the same names. However, in 
the Tayside area of Scotland a Medicines Evaluation and Monitoring 
Group Memo has been set up at the Department of Clinical Pharmacology 
of Dundee University <3;4>. In Tayside each resident has a unique 
Community Health Number (CHNo) which reflects his age and sex and is 
related to his hospital records which are kept in a computerized form. 
The area has some 400,000 residents. This system of record linkage has 
been used to study the post-marketing profile of cimetidine.
Medical Record linkage systems like Memo seem to be a case of first 
choice in highly centralized health care systems provided that each patient 
is identifiable by a unique number, that diagnoses are collected reliably on 
a standardized basis, and provided finally that the confidentiality of the 
records is guarded beyond any doubt. However, the higher the degree of 
centralization in a system of record linkage, the larger the problem to 
safeguard confidentiality. Furthermore, the overall size of the system 
must be very large, if drug surveillance aims at low risk levels. Record 
linkage in Tayside with 400,000 residents found 3802 persons, who took 
the drug cimetidine between August 1980 and April 1981. The size of that 
group does not permit to reach beyond risk level -3. Especially in the case 
of new drugs it is important to rapidly achieve large sample sizes of drug 
takers. In this respect PEM with its 50 millions of England's inhabitants as 
a data base is a much more economical system of record linkage. A 
system like Memo incurs the high costs of linking all medical records 
irrespective of any preformulated question. PEM incurs but the 
marginally low costs of linking records on a selective, ad hoc basis in 
view of a specific question.
Memo is a comprehensive system of record linkage, whereas PEM is 
an event-related linkage system. Both systems have specific advantages 
which make them complementary rather than competitive. The 
comprehensive linkage of medical records makes it possible to study a 
drug over a long period of time against variously formed control groups. 
Usually there exists already some kind of alert or suspicion that the drug 
may cause some event. The alert may come from pre- or from 




























































































of post-marketing clinical evaluation of a drug. It may be used for 
abbreviating preclinical phase III research by the early monitored release 
of a drug. This abbreviation is especially valuable for serious diseases and 
drugs with high, life-saving benefits and a correspondingly high level of 
acceptable risks. Comprehensive record linkage has also a comparative 
advantage in evaluating dmgs used intermittently during short intervalls. 
However, in situations of rarely occuring drug-related events and lower 
levels of acceptable risks the comprehensive linkage of all medical records 
is an uneconomical approach. It is speedier and far less costly to use the 
PEM method and to link the medical records in respect to a specific drug 
or a particular group of drugs. This can be done retrospectiveley for 
already existing drugs and concurrently for newly introduced drugs.
A well functioning PEM-surveillance helps to turn a major weakness 
of a spontaneous ADR-reporting scheme like the Yellow Card System into 
a major strength. If doctors would report all drug-related observations 
routinely, the system would be overburdened by too much "statistical 
noise". If, however, the reporting of events on a broad scale is 
economized by the PEM method, spontaneous reporting can be reserved 
to the very unusual drug related observations. This raises the probability 
that even very rarely occuring adverse (or beneficial) drug reactions will 
be discovered relatively early during marketing.
In view of the fact that the company which has researched and is 
marketing a drug has in-depth information on the drug and is 
continuously up-dating it through its own information system, general 
PMS-systems ought to cooperate closely with the drug companies. In the 
United States the FDA receives the preponderant share of its information 
on ADRs from the drug companies.
Recently there have been efforts to create a new market for the 
medical records of the GPs. With the tendency to computerize the clerical 
work of general practices software suppliers have realized that the 
medical records represent a wealth of information for the drug companies 
provided the records could be linked in a standardized form. Companies 
selling computer systems to GPs offer the systems free of charge if the 
GPs in turn agree to link their records to the system. IMS too is starting 
to capitalize on the record linkage of GPs. It remunerates GPs for their 
willingness to cooperate in what it calls Drug Event Monitoring System 
Demos, and sells the evaluation to the drug companies. The trend to 
commercialize the patients’ medical records has its own by-product 
distortions <23>.
First, record linkage has the highest value to the drug compnay, if it 
can be used to generate observations on a specific drug promotion. The 
major advantage of prescription event monitoring is its ex post factum 
nature. The doctor reports his observations uninfluenced by the 
knowledge that somebody might be interested in his observations. In a 
promotional study he is paid for supplying observations on a specific 




























































































of the drug observations which he supplies. He is induced to change his 
therapy in response to the drug observation. In that situation it is most 
likely that the physician chooses to treat less risky patients, so that the 
final evaluation of the data overestimates the relative safety of the drug.
Second, if commercialized record linkage is used in promotional 
studies of new drug introductions more time elapses after which the first 
non-distorted observations on a large scale become available. Finally, 
even if the willingness of doctors to cooperate with drug event alerting 
schemes remains unaffected, his ability to cooperate is reduced by the 
increased effort demanded by record linkage. Thus, the ability to detect 
ADRs relatively early by Yellow or Green Cards suffers the more 
widespread commercialized record linkage becomes.
The probability increases that a major drug disaster occurs. To avoid 
it the commercialization of general practice record linkage ought to be 
regulated by the subcommittee on adverse drug reactions. Regulation by 
the subcommittee is not understood in a close, day to day supervision of 
its operation. No individual PMS system is an efficient solution to all 
problems of drug surveillance. Memo, PEM, and Yellow Cards have their 
specific comparative advantages. A commercialized linkage of general 
practice medical records, if properly executed and linked to programs 
like Memo or PEM, may be of value both to GPs, drug companies and to 
drug surveillance. What is important is that the various drug surveillance 
systems are operated under the respect of the principles of their mutual 
complementarity.
D.Principles of a Common European Approach to the 
Regulation of Drug Development
1. The Decentralization of the Systems of Post-Marketing Drug 
Monitoring
The free movement of drugs in the European Community is not only 
hindered by the fact that the national competent authorities render 
different value judgements on the merits of therapeutic approaches and on 
issues of relative benefits and risks of drugs. On top of these drug-specific 
differences come health-policy-specific differences in the operation of the 
social security system, and industry-specific differences in the control of 
the drug industry's prices and profits, and differences in the extent to 
which national governments assist their national drug industry by more or 
less hidden protectionist devices.
A common European approach to deal with drug-specific issues is, 
therefore, only a first step toward to free movement of drugs in the 
Community. A new drug may be "authorized" to be marketed 




























































































is uniform throughout the Economic Community. First of all, drug- 
specific reservations towards a drug's use will persist in the national 
medical communities despite the fact that a central European institution 
like EIDA has given one set of value judgements where previously a 
multiplicity of sets of value judgements had been given. A German 
doctor, for instance, will use a new antibiotic more restrictively and a 
new oral antidiabetic less restrictively than his British colleague. Only in 
the long-run may the work of EIDA erode such differences. Second, even 
when no drug-specific differences of drug use exist, health policy and 
industry specific national measures may still create discriminatory 
conditions of availability. Consequently, a uniform community-wide 
marketing authorization will not result in a uniform pattern of drug use.
That means that the observed ADR profile of a drug is likely to vary 
from country to country. Aplastic anaemia has been related to 
chloramphenicol in Great Britain or Belgium, but not in Germany. 
Pulmonary hypersensitivity upon taking nitrofurantoin has been reported 
in Finland and Sweden, but not in Germany, Great Britain, or Holland. 
SMON as a reaction to clioquinol seems to be limited to Japan. Hence, 
there may also be population-specific patterns of adverse drug reactions. 
Population-specific covers a wide range of racial, genetic, dietetic aspects 
and culturally, socially, and economically determined ways of behaviour.
If the ADR profile of a drug may be country-specific, it is a matter of 
principle that the system for reporting and analyzing the ADR profile has 
to be country-specific too. Yet this is also a question of organizational 
expendiency. The study of the British approach to post-marketing 
surveillance demonstrated that the range of possible solutions to the 
discovery of ADRs critically depends upon the institutional characteristics 
of the health care service. A system like PEM would not work outside of 
the environment of the British National Health Service, whereas a 
spontaneous reporting scheme like the Yellow Card System can be and has 
been realized in most countries. Nevertheless even spontaneous reporting 
schemes may differ in their mode of operation. In the USA, for instance, 
most (85%) spontaneous reports on drugs come from dmg companies, in 
Great Britain most (85%) come from doctors.
Because each member state of the Community has a health care system 
which is sui generis to a large degree, each member state should have the 
freedom to develop its own solution to the post-marketing evaluation of 
drugs. Each member state needs a spontaneous reporting scheme. Yet 
beyond that requirement a wide latitude of approaches is feasible. 
Countries with a decentralized health care system may find it more 
appropriate to rely on post-marketing clinical studies using cohorts of 
linked medical records. Countries with a centralized health care system 
may try to follow the British approach to rely more on post-marketing 
surveillance proper. Great Britain is a model case, in that it demonstrates 
that the Yellow Card System is run by the DOH, i.e. by the government, 




























































































operating along different conceptual lines. Despite this diversity of 
approaches in conceptual and institutional design, close cooperation in 
post-marketing monitoring is achieved. The freedom to develop country- 
specific solutions to the drug monitoring task increases the degree of 
search and experimentation, thus widens the choice set from which to 
borrow concepts and approaches.
Although the national competent authorities should retain the overall 
responsibility for the post-marketing drug monitoring, it would be 
preferable if EIDA would coordinate the community-wide cooperation of 
the monitoring systems. At present, for instance, PEM offers unique 
possibilities to perform in-depth studies of ADR profiles down to very 
low risk levels. Why should such a capability not be used to investigate 
spontaneous reports of suspected ADRs received in Spain, or why should 
it not be used to study the ADR profile of a drug which originated in 
France? If EIDA could assure itself that the national monitoring systems 
would cooperate closely some important results would follow.
Firstly, the drug discovery process is highly empirical in character. 
Neither the potential range of adverse, nor that of beneficial drug 
reactions is to be discerned by pre-market observations to a high degree 
of certainty. Post-marketing monitoring is not only essential for 
establishing the benefit-risk ratio of a drug, thus making its use more 
rational and efficient, it is also a drug-discovery method by itself. What is 
considered to be the beneficial and the adverse effect of a substance may 
change over time as more is leamt about it. The effect of a sulfonamide 
compound to lower the level of blood sugar is an adverse effect, if the 
primary use is seen in its bacteriostatic properties. However, that same 
effect becomes the therapeutic one, if the substance is developed into an 
oral antidiabetic. Thus, a highly performing system of post-marketing 
drug monitoring is
(a) a contribution to increasing the efficiency of drug therapy,
(b) a method to search for new indications of existing drugs,and
(c) a method to discover completely new kinds of drugs.
Secondly, the overall level of relative drug safety is to a considerable 
degree the result of a trade-off between the extent of the pre-marketing 
and the post-marketing evaluation of a drug. This has neatly been brought 
out by the former FDA-commissioner Alexander Schmidt in his famous 
"equation" determining the level of drug safety <30, p.l6>:
Information Ability to get Ability to Ease of
needed to + information + control use + withdrawal of = C 
approve after marketing after marketing drug approval
The first two elements of the equation state that any constant level of drug 
safety C results from a combined effort of pre- and post-marketing drug 
study. Thus, if the national competent authorities use the full potential of 
the diversity of approaches to post-marketing drug monitoring, in no 




























































































more options to search for ways to lower the ever increasing demand for 
more animal and clinical studies. In comparison to other world markets 
the European Community would have a unique capability to limit the 
increase both in time and in costs of developing new drugs. This increases 
the comparative advantage of the European drug industry.
Thirdly, a decentralized approach to post-marketing monitoring 
reduces the likelihood of panic decisions. Experience has shown that the 
general public has an irrational attitude towards drug-related risks. In the 
case of oral contraceptives it had been established that the risk of a young, 
healthy woman to die from thrombosis is eight times higher, if she takes 
the pill. What a tremendous increase of risk! However, with a ratio of one 
per 100,000 per year the risk of dying from thrombosis after taking the 
pill is ten times smaller than the risk of committing suicide, maybe 
because of an unintended pregnancy. And what about the risk of dying 
from pregnancy for other reasons? It is this kind of irrationality towards 
drugs which forces even competent authorities to render panic decisions, 
Opren is a case in point. Panic decisions "protect" by denying a treatment 
without asking for the costs of such a denial in terms of pains alleviated 
and lives saved. A decentralized institutional design of the post-marketing 
of dmg monitoring is a shield against panic decisions. A certain drug may 
have a country specific incidence of an ADR. It is then up to the national 
competent authority to weigh the evidence and to take the appropriate 
measures. A central European agency would find it very difficult to 
defend a nation-specific decision. Should the drug-related event be a fatal 
one, the pressure by the general public to revoke the product licence for 
the whole Community becomes almost irresistable. Thus a decentralized, 
nation-specific monitoring of drug events reduces the industry’s risk of 
unjustified product recalls and protects the patients’ genuine interest in an 
adequate dmg therapy.
2. The Centralization of the Regulation of Pre-Marketing Drug 
Development as a Problem of Institutional Design
The experience with the mutual recognition and concertation procedures 
under EC directives proves one point beyond any doubt. The community­
wide centralization of the regulation of the dmg development process up 
to the decision on the marketing authorization is the precondition for an 
eventual free movement of medicinal products in the European 
Community. There has to be founded a European Institution for Dmg 
Admission (EIDA). But by relying on different organizational principles, 
EIDA can be shaped into two opposing directions. Following the approach 
of the United States and several European countries EIDA may be 
realized in the form of a European Drug Agency (EDA). Adhering to 
British traditions EIDA may become a European Committee on the Safety 
of Medicines (ECSM). Which way should be chosen? The answer has to 




























































































of drug development takes place, and in reference to the problems of the 
regulatory task.
2.1. The Political Environment of Drug Regulation
The general public is an important part of the regulatory environment. 
Mistrust, emotionalization and a tendency to uninformed value judgements 
are the main characteristics of the public's attitude toward the drug 
industry. Ever since Senator Kefauver lauched his hearings on the drug 
industry, the public has heard of sensational reports on monopolistic 
prices, on unfounded claims of drug efficacy and safety, and on trivial 
innovations advertised as breakthroughs in therapy. Parliamentary 
investigations, monopoly commission reports, court trials under anti­
cartel laws, studies by consumer protection associations, all have added 
pieces of evidence, fancy and folklore to the public image of the drug 
industry. The more the representatives of the drug industry and other 
observers know that this image is distorted, the more important the 
public’s attitude becomes as a problem of public policy design.
First, the public demands protection and security against faulty claims 
and dangerous medicinal products. Second, the drug industry has neither 
the capability to ensure that no cases of misconduct will occur, nor has it 
the credibility that it would do so, if it were able to. Third, the public is 
quite uninformed about drugs, how they work, what their benefits, what 
their relative risks are. Most people have at best only a very vague 
realization of Paracelsus' dictum, that drugs are useful poisons. For these 
reasons EIDA has to be credible in both directions (a) towards the general 
public and (b) towards the drug industry. It should avoid being drawn 
into the adversarial relationship which exists between the public and the 
industry.
2.2. The Problems o f the Regulatory Task
An all-important problem of the regulatory task is given by the high 
degree of empiricism of the drug discovery and development process. 
Where theory has a low capability to predict what can reasonably be 
expected to follow from a set of conditions the "art of muddling through" 
is a sensible scientific approach. In reference to drug regulation it is not 
called "muddling through" but "flexible and pragmatic". Yet the demand 
on the regulator is the same. Being flexible and pragmatic does not imply 
being without principles. It simply means that the regulator is keenly 
aware of the limitations of established principles. A scientific rule, well 
founded in past experience, may imperceptively become an unfounded 
article of faith or scientific dogma.
Animal studies have been highly useful in the past in avoiding drug 
disasters and in gaining pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic insights. 




























































































humans. Furthermore, the demands on animal studies have risen to the 
point where the sacrifice of hecatombs of animals become ethically 
undefensible. Animal studies are a central issue in the judgement on how 
to conduct the discovery of drugs.
In the United States no tests in healthy volunteers may be performed 
without the prior permission by the FDA. Animal studies are a vital input 
into the decision whether or not to allow the tests in healthy humans. In 
Great Britain the testing on healthy humans can be performed without the 
prior permission of the CSM. It has to issue a Clinical Trial Certificate 
(CTC) before tests in patients begin. Clearly the US approach puts more 
emphasis on animals as reliable models of drug evaluation than the 
British. Furthermore, the CTX clarification is given by the CSM almost 
routinely, provided that there is reasonable confidence in the scientific 
standard of conducting the trials in patients. The CSM does not consider 
ethical questions. These are left to the responsibility of local ethics 
committees. Thus an institution like EIDA has to exert judgements on 
issues of testing in humans after or prior to a CTC clearance and on the 
density of supervising clinical trials, ethical questions included or 
excluded.
The next step, where serious issues of judgement have to be decided, 
starts with the process of evaluating the documentary evidence submitted 
with the marketing application. The requirements on the collection of the 
documentary evidence have been standardized by EC directives and are 
not below US standards. But important value judgements have to be 
exercised in each individual application. To what extent should evidence 
gained by double-blind randomized clinical trials be required? That 
requirement may raise highly controversial ethical questions in specific 
situations. To what extent is it preferable to test the drug in a statistically 
less demanding context? Or may it be better to test it mostly in the 
naturalistic environment of post-marketing surveillance? How is the 
benefit risk profile of a drug to be evaluated? And finally, the regulatory 
authority has to answer how much responsibility it wants to delegate to 
the doctor and his patient to decide what risks are acceptable to them.
Looking over this list of questions two conclusions follow. First, the 
questions concern issues where medical and related expertise are required 
to sharply focus each issue. However, the answer belongs to one of two 
kinds. Either the issue is one where scientists may disagree on reasonable 
scientific grounds. Or the issue concerns a plain value judgement. Second, 
the questions originate at highly critical steps in the drug innovation 
process. Examples are: When to go from animal studies to those in 
humans? Is a trial certificate required? How much evidence on animals is 
requested, if a certificate is required? How closely are trials in patients to 
be monitored? How much freedom is left for the design of the trials? How 
is the trade-off between pre- and post-marketing drug monitoring 
decided? How much responsibility ought to be left to the patient and his 




























































































acceptable? How these questions are posed, and how they are answered is 
obviously vitally important for the performance of the drug innovation 
process.
3.The Problem of the Design of a European Institution of Drug 
Admission (EIDA)
With the profiles of the problems posed by the political environment and 
by the regulatory task itself as a background we compare the two 
institutional options, the agency solution EDA on the one hand with the 
expert committee solution ECSM on the other.
In whatever form EIDA would be realized a major problem is to gain 
credibility in both directions, that is with the general public and its 
political representatives and with the drug industry and the medical 
community. Public Regulation is a typical US American institution. The 
US evidence shows that regulatory bodies do not escape a severe 
accusation <15;27;41;46;>:
Although they have been founded in order to control the industry in 
the Public Interest, they have been captured by the industry to 
"control" it in the industry's interest.
The US FDA is no exception. Consumer groups, Naider's Raiders, 
congressional members and committees are always ready to suspect that 
the FDA gives in to industry pressure. In the past there have been periods 
when year after year between 35 and 40 congressional hearings had been 
held on the FDA. Anyone who has read the transcripts knows that the 
atmosphere tended to be chilly, and that the burden of labour put on the 
agency staff for the preparation of defences was enormous.
One particularly drastic case involved the admission of the beta- 
blocker propranolol for the treatment of angina pectoris to the US market 
in 1974. By that time the drug had already become the standard treatment 
for angina in Great Britain, where it was considered to be a major 
breakthrough against hypertension, an indication not permitted in the 
United States. Why this delay of a drug which had already become the 
standard treatment outside of the USA? There were suspicions that certain 
strains of mice developed cancer! But how much weight is to be given to 
such a suspicion in view of the fact that the suffering patients had a low 
life expectancy anyhow, and the only alternative were open heart surgery? 
However, the FDA stood under very severe congressional criticism for its 
decision to admit propranolol for the indication of angina. From March 
until October 1974 it had to defend itself before the Subcommittee on 
Intergovernmental Relations, the Senate Committee on Government 
Operations, and the Senate Health Subcommittee. Lasagna and Wardell 
qualify these congressional interventions as follows:
"The continuing congressional criticism of the final approval of beta- 
blockers for angina is destined to become a classic in the history of 




























































































and regulation of drugs. It is hard to believe that an advisory 
committee was still debating the approval of this drug for angina 
when a physician's failure to use this drug - for instance as a trial in 
most patients prior to coronary artery surgery - would be regarded, if 
not as malpractice, then certainly as substantially suboptimal medical 
practice" (original emphasis) <53, p.l22>.
Although the fate of the FDA is to some extent uniquely American, it is 
certain that an EDA would not escape similar pressures of political 
pharmacology. Maybe the pressures would be less visible and more subtle, 
yet they would be exercised. But political pharmacology destroys the 
fundamentals of credibility in all directions. Every report on political 
pressures reinforces the public's conviction that EDA is deficient in the 
exercise of its duties. Political pressures may become a provocation of the 
expertise of the medical community, and they certainly will be received 
inimically by the dmg industry. An agency, therefore, has to protect itself 
against the potential of universal distrust by taking appropriate 
safeguards.
Firstly, it must insist on formal and well documented procedures and 
on avoiding informal encounters. Secondly, an agency has a built-in 
tendendy to favor pre-marketing evidence on drug efficacy and safety 
over post-marketing evidence. Any negative piece of evidence gained 
after the dmg has been authorized to be marketed may be used to accuse it 
of negligence or of a pro-industry bias. Since only negative evidence will 
be noticed, the positive one is taken for granted, the agency has to assure 
itself by pre-marketing investigations that the likelihood of negative post­
marketing evidence is kept to a minimum. In case some piece of negative 
evidence turns up during a drug's use, it is imperative that the agency is 
able to prove that it has adhered strictly to the standard procedures of 
conducting animal and clinical studies. The agency has a tendency to be 
dogmatic in regard to dmg testing procedures. This explains the fact that 
new test procedures rarely replace older ones; in most cases new tests, 
especially during animal investigations are just added on to the old ones. 
A third result follows. The true benefit risk ratio of a dmg cannot be 
established for lower risk levels by using the normal mles on sample sizes 
of patient groups. An agency, therefore, has the incentive to ask for an 
increase of the sample sizes during clinical research. Again, the strict 
adherence to standard protocols protects against the accusation of 
negligence. Thus, not only the choice of sample sizes but also the 
formation of patient groups is biased by the agency's risk aversion against 
political pharmacology. It is always safer to add another kind of control 
group. Fourthly, it becomes apparent that the agency is forced by the ever 
present threat of political pharmacology to try to oversee the whole dmg 
discovery and development process as close as possible. In this respect it is 
only consequential that the FDA regulates the testing of dmgs in healthy 
volunteers and that it closely oversees the design of patient clinical studies. 




























































































qualified staff. A scientist joining a drug agency discovers that the 
procedures have to be bureaucratic. He has little chance to contact 
members of the outside scientific community informally on problems of 
regulatory control. On the one hand he has to be so well qualified that he 
is able to evaluate research results from the frontiers of science, on the 
other hand he has to be resigned to live in a bureaucratic environment far 
away from the frontiers of knowledge. Over the years the stock of his 
scientific expertise becomes obsolete. The agency expert tends to have low 
credentials.
A comparison between this set of behaviorsal incentives and the 
profile of the requirements of the regulatory task reveals a striking 
contradicion. The regulator is called upon to be keenly aware of the 
limitations of medical theory and pharmacology to predict and to explain 
the effects of chemical compounds. He must be open to surprises and to 
untried methods. His conceptual grasp of the nature of the innovation 
process must be a "high surprise model". Yet the constraints on the 
regulatory agency force the regulator to act, as if the drug discovery and 
development process were adequately portrayed by a "low surprise 
model". The regulator has to act on the basis of a wrong model of 
innovation. The forces of cognitive dissonance (or consonance) assure that 
in the long-run the agency will be staffed by people adhering to the "low 
surprise model" of the innovation of drugs.
Decisions on the basis of the wrong model of innovation have obvious 
consequences. This can be proved by refering on evidence of the work of 
the FDA <6;7;13;14;25;26;28;37;39;52;53>. When the regulatory 
requirements of the Kefauver Amendment were introduced, the United 
States experienced a very substantial drug-lag. In comparison to European 
countries, especially Great Britain, important new drugs were retarded in 
their introduction the United States. A pharmacologist wrote in 1975:
"It is obvious to every English-speaking medical student outside the 
United States who buys an American textbook of pharmacology or 
medicine, only to find that the sections on current drugs on 
therapeutics are so out of date that he has to buy a British textbook as 
well...American textbooks are so hopelessly out of date when used 
abroad as to be often irrelevant" <52, p.l65>.
In the same volume it was also reported that Great Britain has almost 
twice as many new drug introductions than the United States which 
previously was the country leading in new drug introductions. 
Consequently, the choice of the wrong model of innovation has reduced 
the rate of new drug discovery and the availability of advances in drug 
therapy. It must be added, that in the meantime the FDA has worked 
heard to make its regulatory process more efficient. However, it did so 
only grudgingly. And without the hard evidence from Great Britain, that 
is from a country with a different approach to drug regulation, there 




























































































therefore, of overriding importance that the British, the expert committee 
approach to drug regulation is taken.
It starts with a select committee of the European Parliament which 
chooses outside members of a European Medical Control Agency 
(EMCA) from various specializations like medicine, pharmacology, 
chemistry, industry, etc., two for each country. The European 
Commission nominates in consultation with the EMCA members of 
European Subcommittees, e.g. on the Safety of Medicines, and on a 
European Pharmacopeia. The members, two for each country, are again 
drawn from various specializations. The Subcommittees like the ECSM 
specialize by forming subcommitees of their own. The ECSM, for 
instance, establishes subcommittees on
* chemistry and pharmacology,
* biotechnology,
* herbal products,
* toxicology, clinical trials, and therapeutic efficacy,
* adverse drug reactions.
The European Commission establishes a European Drug Agency (EDA) 
with a Licensing Authority. EDA handles the clerical and administrative 
work for committees like the ECSM and the respective subcommittees. 
The Licensing Authority of EDA is not bound by decisions of the ECSM. 
However, it has to re-consult the ECSM, if it deviates from its opinion. 
The European Medical Control Agency is the board of appeals in all cases 
decided by the Licensing Authority.
This approach to drug regulation transforms EIDA into a hybrid 
form of organization. On the one side, there is a central bureaucracy and 
a central competent authority for new drug applications. On the other 
side, expert committees act as intermediates in the decision making 
process and on the board of appeals. Outside experts are much more 
independent in their career than inside employees. In comparison to a 
central agency a committee of experts is more diffuse in its operation. It 
is, therefore, politically more difficult to attack an expert committee than 
a central agency. Expert comittees tend to be formed of the eminent 
representatives of the various sciences. They ensure that the regulatory 
work is closely attached to the frontier of knowledge. This lends them a 
higher degree of credibility. Because of their scientific prestige and their 
political independence expert committees shield the European Drug 
Agency against efforts of political pharmacology. The British CSM does 
operate informally, it does grant hearings in cases of dispute, where the 
FDA has to insist on written representations. Informality is vitally 
important in situations of uncertainty. The researcher may observe certain 
unexpected abnormalities in some species of animals or during in-patient 
studies. Should he report to the regulator? In a formal procedure he risks 
that the whole development process will be stopped. Thus, he opts not to 
report the observation. The committee offers the opportunity to discuss 




























































































and development of drugs is a process of sequential decision making on a 
pathway characterized by a high degree of empiricism. At several points 
of this pathway critically important enlightened judgements on matters of 
test design, weighing of evidence, trade-offs between different values, etc. 
have to be made. An expert committee has both a higher degree of 
enlightment and a larger ability to act accordingly. It works according to 
the "high surprise model" of drug innovation. Thus the European 
Institution of Drug Admission is appropriately realized by creating 
*a European Drug Agency EDA as the Licensing Authority which 
cooperates with
*a European Committee on the Safety of Medicines ECSM under the 
authority of
*a European Medical Control Agency EMC A.
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